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TAX COMMENT
attitude is visible in the decision of the Baldwin case, for there is
nothing inherent in the power of double taxation which renders it.
liable to the indictment of taking property without due process of law,
as the Supreme Court itself maintained for many years, and the fact
that bond owners resent being taxed in two places is no reason for
invoking constitutional prohibitions. The remedy should be in the
hands of the Legislatures, either of the several states, or of the Fed-
eral Government. It is submitted that the question of double taxation
is properly the subject of social and economic considerations which
should make their appeal to the Legislatures, rather than constitu-
tional control by the courts under the Fourteenth Amendment.
V. B.
WHAT INTERESTS MAY A TRANSFEROR RETAIN IN TRANS-
FERRED PROPERTY WITH.OUT LIABILITY FOR THE FEDERAL ESTATE
TAx ?-Since the days of yore people have matched their wits against
revenue collectors, in attempts to avoid payment of taxes. Human
nature nas not changed a whit and today we find a similar situation
present in the collection of estate taxes.
The purpose of the Federal Inheritance Tax laws I is to tax the
privilege of passing property 2 and not the right to receive the prop-
erty which is 'the sine qua non of the divers state inheritance tax
laws. 3 The absolute transfers of property during the life of the donor
fall outside the provisions of the tax since they are clearly not in
' The Federal Estate Tax can be traced back to 1797, when, under the
Stamp Tax Act an inheritance tax was imposed. During the Civil and Spanish-
American Wars similar taxes were levied, but for short periods. Our present
Act is based on the Rev. Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 777 (1916), which has frequently
been amended. Rev. Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1097 (1919) ; Act of 1921, 42 Stat.
277 (1921) ; Rev. Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 303 (1924), 26 U. S. C., sec. 1092;
Rev. Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 69 (1926). The present inheritance tax lavs are
under title III.
2 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747 (1899). The Court
stated, "It is the power to transmit, or the transmission from the dead to the
living, on which such taxes are immediately rested." Edwards v. Slocum,
264 U. S. 61, 44 Sup. Ct. 239 (1924), Holmes, J., "A taxable interest is not
one to which some person succeeds but is an interest which ceases by reason
of the death." Matter of Schmidlapp Est., 236 N. Y. 278, 140 N. E. 697
(1923), "It is a tax upon the creation of a right, not a charge upon the fruition
in enjoyment or possession." Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct.
710, 71 L. ed. 1084 (1927) ; see also Kroeger, Inheritance Taxation of Trans-
fers Not Taking Place at Death (1930), 15 St. Louis L. Rev. 113, 117.
2 The entire question of state and Federal inheritance taxes is treated in an
exhaustive and scholarly series of articles by Professor Rottschaefer, Taxation
of Transfers Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoyment at Grantor's
Death (1930), 14 Minn. L. Rev. 453 and 603; see also Stimson. When Revo-
cable Trusts Are Subject to Inheritance Taxes (1926), 25-Mich. L. Rev. 839;
Pinkerton and Millsaps, Inheritance and Estate Taxes (1926), p. 9; Gleason
and Otis, Inheritance Taxes (3rd ed.). p. 4; Leaphart. Trust to Escape Federal
Income dnd Estate Taxes (1930), 15 Corn. L. Rev. 587.
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contemplation of death. Among the latter are included bona fide
inter vivos gifts and transfers of property for adequate consideration.
4
The statute carefully enumerates the items of property the trans-
fer of which is to be taxed. Among the specified items is:
"Any interest of which the decedent has any time made
a transfer or with respect to which he has at any time created
a trust, in contemplation of, or intended to take effect in pos-
session or enjoyment at or after death, except in consideration
of money or money's worth." 5
To circumvent evasion of the tax laws by distributions in trust
to members of the family, or others, certain inter vivos dispositions
were included as taxable. These inclusions involve the transposition
of such transfers from the potential field of gift taxation to that of
inheritance taxation since the latter are in the nature of a testamen-
tary disposition. 6 What, then, is to distinguish the bona fide trust or
gift from one seemingly made to avoid the onerous tax? How much
of an interest may the settlor retain in the property transferred or
put in trust without subjecting his estate to a death duty?
Unfortunately, the statute does not define just what the settlor
may retain. The Treasury Department has from the first applied the
same interpretation to the section quoted, as given by the state courts,
since its statutory language was drawn from state sources. 7 The Fed-
eral courts in attempting to solve the problem have been following
an erratic course, but in the main favoring the taxpayers. By split-
ting up the bundle of rights transferred into its legal constituents
it becomes easier to comprehend the holdings of the various courts.
It has been the settled law in state courts that where a settlor of
a trust reserves for himself the income for life, the transfer is tax-
able.8 Where only a part of the trust corpus is required for the life
'See Note (1929), 38 Yale L. J. 659.
'Rev. Act of 1928, sec. 302 c.
" Kroeger, supra Note 2.
7 Handy, Inheritance and Other Death Taxes (1929), p. 23. The first state
court to contain the clause, "intended to take effect, etc.," is found in the Penna.
Act of 1826. The Civil and Spanish-American Wars Acts also contained it. In
1892, -it first appeared in New York Tax Legislation. The clause itself and
its implications appear to have been taken from the law of remainders, the
word "possession" referring to the legal, and "enjoyment" to the equitable
estates. McCloy, Recent Developments Affecting Taxation of Irrevocable
Trusts Under Federal Estate Tax Law, 84 N. Y. L. J., Oct. 30, 1930 at 544.
' Rottschaefer, mrpra Note 3 at 628; Matter of Green, 153 N. Y. 223,
47 N. E. 292 (1897); Matter of Cochrane, 117 Misc. 18, 190 N. Y. Supp. 895,
aff'd 202 App. Div. 751, 194 N. Y. Supp. 924 (2nd Dept., 1922). On the basis
that the estate tax is determined by the shifting of economic interests, McCaughn
v. Girard Trust Co., 11 F. (2nd) 520 (C. C. A., 3rd, 1926) ; Reed v. Howbert,
8 F. (2nd) 641 (D., Colo., 1925).
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income, only that part is subject to the inheritance tax.9 Merely
because the right of revocation has been retained as to the trust, does
not make it taxable. This is the majority rule in state courts which
base their contention 'on the principle that since a revocation is neither
a property right nor an estate it cannot pass at death.' 0 A strong
minority hold otherwise on the theory that a gift cannot be absolute
and revocable at the same time." It is submitted that the more prac-
tical view is held by the minority.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court indicated a tendency
to favor a liberal construction for the taxpayer. In Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 12 no tax was declared due on the corpus of five
trusts, even though the settlor reserved power, first, to reinvest the
trust res; second, to require the trustee to execute proxies to his
nominees; third, to execute all leases; fourth, to vote the stock held
by the trustee and to alter the trust itself with the consent of the
beneficiaries. The mere retention of these items were not such
beneficial interests that should be taxed. However, concerning the
other two trusts, the Court did tax the corpus needed to produce the
income for the settlor's life. It seems that the donor retained enough
beneficial or economic interest in the corpus of the five trusts to
make the trusts part of his gross estate. Although it is technically
true that his interest did not pass at his death, it was the event which
shifted to the remaindermen certain benefits and upon that theory the
tax might readily have been imposed.13 The Reinecke case indicates
that extensive powers of control and management do not make the
transfer taxable.
A transfer of a house followed immediately by a renewable lease
by the donees to the donor for a nominal rental was not such a trans-
fer as to be taxable. This was the holding in Nichols v. Coolidge,
though impliedly the donor could have had the lease as long as she
desired.14 The Court stated that since full title vested in the donees
at once, their right to possession or enjoyment did not depend on the
donor's death. To make the vesting of title in the transferee the sole
'Tipps v. Bass (D. C., Texas, 1927), 21 F. (2nd) 460; Cf. Pol v. Miles,
268 Fed. 175 (D. C., Md., 1920); Cf. Hirsh v. U. S. (Ct. of Cl., 1929), 35 F.
(2nd) 982 where property was held non-taxable, it being passed for donee's
promise to pay either donor or his wife a stated annuity for life.10 See Note (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 659; also Thurber, Federal Estate Tax
(1921) 52; Matter of Carnegie, 203 App. Div. 91, 196 N. Y. Supp. 502 (1st
Dept., 1929) ; Matter of Kountze, 120 Misc. 289, 198 N. Y. Supp. 442 (1923);
In re Miller, 236 N. Y. 290, 140 N. E. 201 (1923). On the basis of these
decisions New York courts follow the majority holding of the state decisions.
. Matter of Bostwick, 160 N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208 (1899); see Note
(1928), 6 N. Car. L. Rev. 198; Coolidge v. Com'r, 167 N. E. 757 (1929).
' Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 73
L. ed. 410 (1928).
' "It appears that the real test is not whether a technical legal transfer of
title is effect, but, if in fact economic interests shifted at death." (1930) 18
Cal. L. Rev. 302.1 Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 760, 71 L. ed. 1184 (1927).
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criterion is conducive to tax evasion, with its concomitant loss of
revenue to the government.
With these and the Supreme Court rulings as criteria, a rule
has been established, that "the effect upon taxability of the donor's
reservation of powers of amendment, control, or revocation depends
entirely upon whether their exercise would enable him to divert to
himself the economic benefits of the property. If that is permitted,
the property is includible in the gross estate." 15
Several.months ago, the Supreme Court in a momentous decision
settled a long-standing point of conflict. May v. Heiner 16 denied
taxability under the Revenue Act of 1918 in a case where the donor
created an irrevocable trust in 1917, the income of which was to be
paid to her husband during his life and thereafter to herself. The
decision stated that there was no interest retained by the donor in
the property. Although her death "did obliterate" something, it was
not such an interest that carried with it the postponement of posses-
sion, though it was admitted that enjoyment was postponed. This
case not only flouts the intent of section 302 but practically nullifies
it. As long as the donor retains an interest no matter how specula-
tive, his death shifts some economic interests and the remaindermen
are relieved of a condition that might have defeated their estate. This
"shifting" is the basis of the tax and should therefore cause the
property to be included in the gross estate.17 Technical legal analysis
should bow to practical and economic considerations.
This startling decision has already shown its effect on cases that
followed in the Circuit Courts. McCaugh' v. Carnill 18 held that a
transfer, wherein the settlor reserved the income of an irrevocable
trust, for life to himself, was not taxable as a transfer intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. The transfer
was said not to be testamentary in character since no reservation of
revocation was made. Relying on May v. Heiner, Davis, Ch. J.,
asserted: "There is no difference in law between retaining the entire
or only part of the income from the property." 19 In the May case, it
" Rottschaefer, supra Note 3 at 632.
" May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 233 (1930), revers'g 32 F. (2nd) 1017
(C. C. A., 3rd, 1929). The decision might be upheld on the basis of
retroactive taxation of an irrevocable trust. Frew v. Bowers, 12 F. (2nd)
625 (C. C. A., 2nd, 1926).
7 This statement in effect is the test that Prof. Rothschaefer would apply
as a means of making tax decisions more uniform. He cautions that it is not,
however, a panacea for all ills since it is not easy to determine that a "shift"
occurs at one time or another; supra Note 3; Chandler v. Kelsey, 205 U. S.
466, 27 Sup. Ct. 550 (1907): "shifting of economic benefits is the true subject
of the test of taxability." In Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497 (1930), commented
on in (1930) 5 St. John's L. Rev. 135, the Supreme Court shows that it still
regards the test of shifting of economic benefits.
" McCaughn v. Carnill (C. C. A., 3rd, 1930), V U. S. Daily, Aug. 26,
1930, aff'g (D. C., Pa., 1929) 30 F. (2nd) 696.
"To the same effect see Northern Trust Co. v. Commissioner (Est. of
Van Schaick)'(C. C. A., 7th), June 5, 1930; also the Morsman case (C. C. A.,
8th) appealed from 14 B. T. A. 103 (1928).
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was pointed out, the grantee would give up his entire possession only
at his death, while in the instant case, the settlor at all times retained
the income. The distinction was disregarded.
Commissioner v. McCormick,20 recently decided, gives the situ-
ation a more hopeful hue. After battling with the effects of the
Heiner decision it avoids it on the basis of the rule that the intention
of the settlor is decisive in ascertaining whether a trust may be taxed.
The trust in this case was conditionally revocable. The settlor was to
retain a life use with the possibility of a retransfer. Evans, Ch. J.,
stated: "The irrevocable character of the trust is not the determina-
tive influence of the controversy, but is important only as it helps
illuminate the settlor's intention. So as approaching the question of
irrevocability, a case can be easily conceived where a trust agreement
might be defined as legally irrevocable and yet the estate thus con-
veyed be subject to the Federal inheritance tax."
A recent District Court case included as part of the taxable estate
such property from which the decedent had retained the income for
life and the power to dispose of the property by a will.2 1 The Fed-
eral tax applied even though full legal ownership was not retained by
the donor, since "taxation is a practical question and may be dealt
with in a practical way." In this decision the May decision was not
mentioned and seems correct in that enjoyment and possession clearly
were postponed until death.
Also the Board of Tax Appeals has held that where in the crea-
tion of a trust there is a reservation of the power to change the
beneficiaries and to vary the amounts which they are to receive, the
property in trust was properly included in the estate in computing
the Estate Tax since the transfer of the beneficial interests in the
trust property was not complete until the death of the creator.22 The
basis of the decision is upon the principles stated in Saltonstall v.
Saltonstall, 23 Chase National Bank v. United States 24 and the
Reinecke case.25 Here, the Board in feeling that there would be a
shifting of economic benefits on the donor's death, correctly taxed
the gross estate.
At present the situation is in a decidedly unsatisfactory state of
flux. The May case, although indicating the attitude of mind of the
'Commissioner v. McCormick (C. C. A., 7th, V U. S. Daily 2388),
Oct. 4, 1930.
'Stralton et al. v. U. S. (D. C., Mass., 1930), V U. S. Daily, Sept.
4, 1930.
' Bank of N. Y. and Trust Co. v. Commissioner, V U. S. Daily, Sept. 8,
1930; this decision will no doubt be appealed from, as the amount involvedjustifies it.
Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225. 72 L. ed. 565(1927). (Power of revocation retained, to be exercised in conjunction with
trustee was sufficient basis for state inheritance tax.)
rA Chase Nat. Bank v. U. S., 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126, 47 A. L. R.
525, 73 L. ed. 405 (1928).
mSupra Note 12.
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Supreme Court, does not conclusively point out just what may be
retained by the settlor or donor without being subject to an estate
tax. It has resulted, first, in allowing a large degree of latitude to
those desiring to utilize the trust device as a means of tax avoidance;
second, in almost negativing the effect of section 302 (c).
It is submitted that if the courts become more attentive to the
significant factor of the shifting of economic interests, the problem
will be greatly simplified. It would at least do away with the consid-
eration of technical property rules in the field of taxation, and make
more difficult the circumvention of the taxing statutes. Congress, in
order to prevent this, and to simplify the construction of another
phrase in section 302 (c)-"contemplation of death," by the 1926
Revenue Act, summarily created an absolute presumption that a vol-
untary transfer made within two years prior to the date of death are
testamentary in character and hence in contemplation of death.26 If
that were possible, certainly the taxation of property from which the
transferror retained any economic interest is less revolutionary and
at least not open to attack on constitutional grounds. Furthermore,
increased revenue for the Government would result, together with a
more equitable distribution of the burden of taxation.
WILLIAM H. SHAPIRO.
Shinn, A Conclusive Presumption Against the Constitution, 8 Nat. Tax
Mag. 334 (Oct., 1930).
